Rent Seeking and the Economics of Corruption

Year Published: 
2016
Publication: 
Constitutional Political Economy
Volume: 
27
Pages: 
142–157

The paper studies the influence of Tullock (West Econ J 5:224–232, 1967) and the rent-seeking literature more generally on the study of corruption. The theoretical corruption literature with its emphasis on principal-agent relationships within government and rent creation by corruption politicians has largely, but not entirely, overlooked that contestable rents encourage unproductive use of real resources in seeking these rents. As a consequence, the literature underestimates the value of corruption control and the cost of corruption itself.

My Original Work: 
No
Author (not in Network): 
Toke S. Aidt
Type of Learning Material: 
Research Paper
Type of Scholarly Article: 
Research Paper
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